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The very first line of the Bill of Rights provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."1 This line,
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, was motivated by
the history of religious persecution that drove thousands of adherents
of minority faiths in Europe to the New World to seek refuge to
practice their own faith, free from the compulsion of state-established
religion.2 The Establishment Clause remains relevant today, and the
U.S. Supreme Court has been active in hearing cases involving it. 3
For purposes of determining standing-that is, whether an
individual or organization meets certain constitutional and prudential
requirements for bringing a cause of action 4- - problematic tensions
exist between the theoretical underpinnings of the Establishment
Clause and the Court's recent jurisprudence. 5 For the plaintiff to have
standing to bring a suit, she must have suffered an actual or
threatened injury that is traceable to the alleged act of the defendant
and that would be redressable by a favorable decision of the courts. 6 In
the Establishment Clause context, there are some easy cases where
the litigant has standing. For example, in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp, the plaintiffs were students subject to a state
law directing public school teachers to select daily Bible verses and
lead the class in a recitation of the Lord's Prayer. 7 Here, there is a
clear injury that is individualized (that is, that the student cannot
escape the religious environment created at the school), and the harm
was redressable by an injunction." However, easy standing cases such
as Abington Township are pushed into a gray area when the Court is
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1947) (detailing the history of the
Establishment Clause).
3. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1319 (17th ed.
2010) (describing developments in Establishment Clause jurisprudence).
4. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (describing standing requirements); SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note
3, at 43 (defining what current standing rules require).
5. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1290 ('CThe Court's decisions over the last
decade increasingly employ entirely different sets of analytical devices for distinguishing
establishments."); Note, Standing in the Mud: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,
42 AKRON L. REV. 1277, 1287-90 (2009) (describing the series of taxpayer standing cases
involving various outcomes and holdings by the Court).
6. See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 472 (describing standing requirements).
7. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205-06 (1963).
8. See id. at 206-08 (describing the religious atmosphere that the students at the high
school were subjected to on a daily basis).
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uncertain of how to treat the injury produced by the Establishment
Clause violation. For example, to vary Abington Township's facts, if
the prayer requirement offended the deep convictions of a graduate of
the school as an atheist, does she have an injury sufficient for
standing purposes? Or may a state resident who lives near the school,
but who is childless and thus has no connection to any high school,
bring a case? 9 Thus, even a slight change in the facts of an easy case
can create difficult issues for the courts under current standing
doctrine.
While some aspects of Establishment Clause standing are
relatively clear, the jurisprudence surrounding the injury requirement
is becoming murkier. If we view standing as a spectrum, only the
extremes of Establishment Clause standing are clear. For example, on
one end, cases such as Abington Township clearly meet the injury
requirement for standing purposes. 10 On the other end, in cases such
as Doremus v. Board of Education, where the litigant graduated from
a public high school that later adopted a school prayer requirement,
the Court has held that the plaintiff did not have a sufficient injury for
standing purposes.1' The middle ground of the spectrum presents
difficulty. One issue pushing standing issues out of the easy extremes
of the spectrum and into the tenuous middle ground is that of psychic
or ideological harms.12 Psychic or ideological harms are injuries based
on the harm to a prospective litigant's mind, drawn from the very fact
of the alleged violation itself.1 3 Although purely psychic harms are
putatively insufficient for standing,'14 the Court has begun to allow
injuries that look like psychic or ideological harms, such as in Van
Orden v. Perry, where the plaintiff merely walked past a statue of the
9. The question of whether a graduate of the school may bring a case was answered in
Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1952), but as there have been numerous
developments in standing doctrine since then, this question could be reheard by the Court.
10. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 206-08 (describing the religious atmosphere that the students
at the high school were subjected to on a daily basis).
11. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 432-33.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 115-21 (discussing and elaborating on the nature of
the injury in Van Orden v. Perry).
13. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 485 (1982) ("Although respondents claim that the Constitution has been violated, they
claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them as a consequence of
the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence presumably produced
by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to consider




Ten Commandments several times. 15 Finding this type of harm to be
sufficient for standing complicates the picture of an Establishment
Clause injury. If merely walking past a statue of the Ten
Commandments a few times is sufficient, it is difficult to explain why
a graduate of a public high school could not challenge a prayer
requirement at her alma mater. In short, the Court has begun to allow
injuries that are far more psychic or ideological than actual.
Since nearly all alleged injuries in Establishment Clause cases
involve some sort of psychic or ideological injury, 16 the existence of
standing often depends on how the litigant draws a personal
connection to the alleged violation. These personal connections often
mean the difference between dismissal and adjudication. However,
this critical distinction often turns on seemingly arbitrary factors such
as whether the plaintiff is actively in public school or how often the
plaintiff encounters religious displays on public property. 17 The courts
thus focus on these personal connections between alleged violation
and prospective plaintiff, rather than on the effects of government-
sponsored religion.
The complex jurisprudence surrounding the nature of the
injury requirement in Establishment Clause standing has created a
division between which injuries suffice for standing purposes and
which do not suffice.18 Therefore, prospective litigants must struggle
with determining whether their injury from an alleged Establishment
Clause violation falls on the side of this tenuous line on which courts
grant standing, which would affect whether their claims are heard on
the merits. The uncertainty over which Establishment Clause
violation "injuries" suffice for standing purposes could, and likely does,
deter prospective litigants from raising claims. Since this contravenes
the Framers' intent in writing the Establishment Clause, the Court
should redefine and clarify which injuries are sufficient for standing
This Note analyzes the tensions within the Court's
interpretation of the injury prong of standing requirements in
Establishment Clause cases. This Note argues that: (1) over the last
century, the Court has developed a standing doctrine that is
15. See infra text accompanying notes 115-21 (discussing and elaborating on the nature of
the injury in Van Orden v. Perry).
16. Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 969,
984 (2011).
17. See infra Part III (discussing the factors weighing in favor of standing and those cutting
against standing).
18. See generally Standing in the Mud, supra note 5, at 1287-90 (detailing the series of
cases and challenges to the taxpayer standing prohibition).
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inconsistent and irrational, excluding purely psychic and ideological
injuries that are rooted in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and
(2) the Court should redraw the line for standing and allow purely
psychic and ideological injuries in Establishment Clause cases. Part II
of this Note explores the background of the First Amendment,
including the history and rationale behind the Establishment Clause,
noting its evolution and modern relevance. Part II also discusses
constitutional and prudential standing requirements and how those
standing requirements apply to the Establishment Clause. Part III of
this Note analyzes the tensions and inconsistencies between sufficient
injuries and insufficient injuries under current Establishment Clause
standing doctrine. Part IV of this Note argues that the Court should
clarify this area of law by drawing a new bright-line rule recognizing
all Establishment Clause injuries, subject to some prudential
limitations. In so doing, the Court would clarify standing law and give
future litigants a clearer theoretical structure within which to analyze
their injuries and potential for standing.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND MODERN STANDING LAW
A. History and Overview of the Establishment Clause
The religion clauses in the First Amendment provide that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."19 The first clause, the
Establishment Clause, prohibits the government from establishing an
official religion, while the second clause, the Free Exercise Clause,
protects the free practice of religion or nonreligion by individuals. 20
Both clauses protect religious liberty against the power of the federal
government. 21 Establishment Clause jurisprudence is rife with
conflicting views of exactly what the Clause requires of the
government, however.2 2  The Court has often viewed the
Establishment Clause as requiring a "wall of separation" between
church and state, but it has also interpreted the Clause to require only
19. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1281.
21. LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT, at xiv (2d ed. 1994) ("The establishment clause separates government and religion
so that we can maintain civility between believers and unbelievers as well as among the several
hundred denominations, sects, and cults that thrive in our nation ... .
22. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1275-76.
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formal neutrality among religions, or between religion and
nonreligion, in government action.23
The history of the Establishment Clause supports the "wall of
separation" metaphor.24 When the Framers drafted the Bill of Rights
in the late eighteenth century, the United States was largely
populated by Europeans who had emigrated to escape religious
persecution because of their adherence to minority religions. 25 The
Framers were concerned not only with religious persecution of
minority faiths, but also with the establishment of a national faith
and resulting taxation to support the national religion.26 In 1785 and
1786, the Virginia Assembly held debates to renew Virginia's tax levy
for the state's established religion. 27 James Madison and Thomas
Jefferson, among others, argued against renewal. 28 Madison wrote
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment, opposing
renewal of the tax and arguing that it was in the best interests of the
new state to recognize that religion was best separated from law and
that persecution was an inevitable result of government-established
faiths. 29 Members of the Virginia legislature widely accepted
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance and rejected the tax renewal. 30
Jefferson penned the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, which the
Virginia legislature adopted in rejecting the tax renewal. In this
environment, the legislature then passed a statute providing "[t]hat
no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious
worship, place, or ministry whatsoever."31 Three years later, both
Madison and Jefferson were key drafters of the Establishment Clause
in the Bill of Rights. 32
However, the history of the Establishment Clause can also
support the idea that the government's role is only to maintain formal
23. Id.
24. LEVY, supra note 21, at 245; see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1947)
(detailing the history of the Establishment Clause).
25. Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-10.
26. Id.
27. SULLIVAN & GUNTER, supra note 3, at 1276.
28. Id.
29. JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, PRESENTED TO THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, AT THEIR SESSION IN 1785, IN CONSEQUENCE OF A BILL
BROUGHT INTO THAT ASSEMBLY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION BY LAW (Worcester, Mass.,
Thomas 1786).
30. LEVY, supra note 21, at 67-69.
31. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12-13; see also LEVY, supra note 21, at 68-69 (detailing Madison's
support for Jefferson's bill for religious freedom).
32. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1277.
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neutrality among religions and therefore not establish a national
church. 33 Some interpretations of Madison's writings find that the
Framers intended that the Establishment Clause require only formal
neutrality among religions, but that the government may express a
preference for religion over nonreligion.3 4 This "nonpreferentialist"
viewpoint has been expressed by members of the Court, though
primarily in dissenting opinions, but it still carries some weight in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.3 5
While the nonpreferentialist view is somewhat grounded in
history and has been relied on in numerous dissents, 36 the "wall of
separation" metaphor has more support in the textual interpretation
and legislative history of the First Amendment.37 The "wall of
separation" metaphor is the prevailing view in modern interpretations
of the Establishment Clause.38
Some authors and Justices consider it an error to give heavy
weight to the history of the Establishment Clause, given that the
treatment of religion in modern society no longer implicates
widespread concerns of religious persecution and taxation. 39 Justice
Brennan's concurrence in Abington Township questioned the
relevance of history in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
recognizing that "[o]ur religious composition makes us a vastly more
diverse people than were our forefathers. ' 40 Nonetheless, most
Establishment Clause cases draw on historical background and
rationale to some extent.4'
33. Id. at 1278.
34. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It seems
indisputable ... that [Madison] saw the Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of
a national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as
requiring neutrality on the part of government between religion and irreligion.").
35. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1278; see also Douglas Laycock,
"Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
875, 877 (1986) ('CThe prominence and longevity of the nonpreferential aid theory is remarkable
in light of the weak evidence supporting it and the quite strong evidence against it.").
36. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 854-58 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing support for a nonpreferentialist view); Wallace, 472 U.S. at
98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing for a nonpreferentialist view of the Establishment
Clause).
37. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612-16 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (refuting
nonpreferentialist arguments by citing history of the drafting of the Establishment Clause).
38. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1247.
39. E.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237-38 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring),
40. Id. at 240.




Since 1946, the Supreme Court has incorporated the
Establishment Clause such that it now applies to both federal and
state actions.42 In Everson v. Board of Education, the Court held that
the Establishment Clause applied to a New Jersey statute that
allowed public funds to be used to bus students to parochial schools as
well as to public schools. 43 Although the Court found that the statute
was constitutional, the Court applied the Establishment Clause to the
states, drawing on two main reasons for incorporation. 44 First, the
Court found that because the Free Exercise Clause was interpreted
and applied broadly to the states, the Establishment Clause, as a
companion to the Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment,
should be applied broadly as well.45 Second, the Court decided that the
Establishment Clause's goal of protecting civil liberties could not be
achieved without applying the Establishment Clause to the states.46
Although the Court has incorporated the Establishment Clause
against the states since 1946, some modern scholars and Justices
debate whether it was correct to do so.47 Justice Thomas, relying on
some contemporary scholarship in a concurring opinion in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, determined that the Establishment Clause was
primarily a structural limitation on the national government. 48 Under
this view, the Establishment Clause operates as a limitation on the
power of the national government over the states, limiting any
interference by the national government over the states with respect
to establishment of religion. 49 If the Establishment Clause is
understood as a structural limitation, incorporation of the
42. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947); see also Kathryn Elizabeth Komp,
Unincorporated, Unprotected: Religion in an Established State, 58 VAND. L. REV. 301, 308 (2005)
(discussing Everson and incorporation against the states).
43. Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-18.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 15-16.
47. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1157-58
(1991) ("[Tihe nature of the states' establishment clause right against federal dis-establishment
makes it quite awkward to 'incorporate' the clause against the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Komp, supra note 42, at 303-04 (noting that "a number of judges and scholars
have proposed that the Establishment Clause be unincorporated").
48. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) ('The
Establishment Clause originally protected States, and by extension their citizens, from the
imposition of an established religion by the Federal Government. Whether and how this Clause
should constrain state action under the Fourteenth Amendment is a more difficult question.").
49. See Luke Meier, Constitutional Structure, Individual Rights, and the Pledge of
Allegiance, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 162, 163-64 (2006) ("Under the structural view of the Clause,
the primary purpose of the Clause is to prevent the national government from interfering with
the states' ability to establish religion as the citizens of that state may wish.").
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Establishment Clause against the states is inappropriate, as the
Clause was intended to limit only the national government.5 0
However, the Court in Everson interpreted the Establishment
Clause as protecting the rights of individuals against government
establishment of religion and thus applied the Clause to the states. 51
Incorporating the Establishment Clause against the states is logical
when the Clause is understood as a protection of individual rights,
because it would be futile to protect individual rights only against
national establishment and not against state establishment. 52
The applicable test for whether government action violates the
Establishment Clause has evolved over time. The Court has employed
a "coercion" analysis, inquiring whether the allegedly unconstitutional
government action "coerced" individuals into some form of religion.53
However, by the mid-twentieth century, the Court relaxed the coercion
analysis, finding that "indirect coercion" and "psychological coercion"
also violated the Establishment Clause. 54 In 1971, in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, the Court attempted to impose a test for statutes that
allegedly violated the Establishment Clause, finding that they would
not violate the Establishment Clause if they met three requirements:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.' "55 The so-called "Lemon
test" proved problematic in application, however, and the Court
consequently looked to other modes of analysis to supplement (or
supplant) both the looser coercion approach and the Lemon test.56 In
short, the coercion analysis, even in its expanded form, was still too
narrow to encompass all violations of the Establishment Clause.
Beginning in Lynch v. Donnelly in 1984, Justice O'Connor, in a
concurring opinion, advocated an "endorsement" analysis, under
50. Id. at 164 ("Incorporation would prevent exactly what the Clause was designed to
protect: state establishments of religion.").
51. Komp, supra note 42, at 308.
52. Meier, supra note 49, at 164.
53. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1322-25 (explaining the development of
"coercion" analysis); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-33 (1962) (employing and
explaining coercion analysis).
54. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1319 (discussing the importance of the
Court's influential test for Establishment Clause violations set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971)).
55. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
56. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1348, 1350 (giving examples of the
"endorsement" analysis).
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which a government action would violate the Establishment Clause if
the government appeared to favor a religion such that non-adherents
felt like outsiders who were "not full members of the political
community."57 Following Lynch, Justice O'Connor continued to
advocate the endorsement approach as a broader test that would
encompass valid Establishment Clause claims that the coercion
approach could not properly analyze.58 In Allegheny County v.
American Civil Liberties Union, the Court adopted this endorsement
analysis with respect to a holiday display on the steps of a county
courthouse59 and has continued to use the endorsement approach with
respect to public religious displays. 60 The coercion analysis retains
some viability, however, as the Court continues to apply it in
Establishment Clause cases involving schools and students. 61
Although the Court has moved toward the endorsement analysis, it
still has not adopted a single test for Establishment Clause
violations. 62  The different analyses in Establishment Clause
jurisprudence impact the way that the Court has interpreted standing
in this area.
B. Overview of Standing Law
A litigant must have standing to bring any cause of action in
an American court. 63 Standing is a threshold inquiry, involving
constitutional and prudential considerations, to determine whether a
litigant meets certain requirements before the court ever hears the
57. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94
(1989) ("In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged
governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of "endorsing" religion, a concern that has
long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.").
59. Id. at 594 ('Whether the key word is 'endorsement,' 'favoritism,' or 'promotion,' the
essential principle remains the same. The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits
government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from 'making
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.'"
(quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
60. See generally SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1348-53 (describing subsequent
applications of the endorsement approach).
61. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1352.
62. See id. at 1348-53 (describing the current use of both endorsement and coercion
analyses). These differing approaches to determining whether government action violates the
Establishment Clause have been further complicated by the diversity of actions that may violate
the Clause. See id. at 1318-19.
63. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 471 (1982); Standing in the Mud, supra note 5, at 1279 ("Plaintiff standing is but one of
several essential elements needed for a case to be justiciable.").
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merits of the case.64 The standing requirements significantly limit the
power of the judiciary. The constitutional standing requirement is
primarily drawn from Article III of the Constitution, which states that
"judicial power" is limited to hearing only "cases" and
"controversies."65 To meet the constitutional standing requirement, a
litigant must show (1) that an actual or threatened injury exists, (2)
that the behavior or conduct of the defendant caused the injury, and
(3) that a favorable decision by the court could redress the injury.66
Even if a litigant meets the constitutional standing
requirement, the litigant must also survive the prudential limits the
Court has imposed on federal judicial power. 67 First, a litigant must
raise his own legal rights and interests and "cannot rest his claim to
relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. '68 Second, the
federal courts will not hear cases where the injury, although actual
and concrete, is neither particularized nor individualized. 69 The Court
considers these so-called "generalized grievances" asbetter addressed
by one of the other branches of government. 70 Third, the litigant's
complaint must be within "the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."71
Standing requirements implicate important constitutional
limitations on judicial power that delineate aspects of the separation
64. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 471 ("Article III of the Constitution limits the
'judicial power' of the United States to the resolution of 'cases' and 'controversies.' . . . The
requirements of Art. III are not satisfied merely because a party requests a court of the United
States to declare its legal rights, and has couched that request for forms of relief historically
associated with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those trained in the legal
process.").
65. Id. at 471-72; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, §2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies
between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of
different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.").
66. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 472; Standing in the Mud, supra note 5, at
1279.
67. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 474-75.
68. Warth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
69. See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 475.
70. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 44, 46 (discussing the boundaries of the
generalized-grievances limit and explaining the separation of powers rationale as applied to
standing).
71. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
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of powers doctrine.7 2 By limiting the power of the judiciary to hear
only cases consistent with the constitutional and prudential
requirements, the standing doctrine restricts the judiciary to
adjudicating "those disputes which confine . . . courts to a role
consistent with a system of separated powers and which are
traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the judicial
process. '73 Standing requirements are vital when a federal court hears
a case involving the constitutionality of an act or policy of the
legislative or executive branch.7 4 In these cases, the standing
requirements ensure that the court is not issuing advisory opinions or
stepping into a role constitutionally reserved for the executive or
legislature.75 Therefore, the standing requirements are an essential
element of the separation of powers doctrine, and standing
jurisprudence involves substantial limits that the Court has placed on
itself.7 6
Since the 1970s, the Court has further developed standing
requirements with respect to groups and organizations.7 7 In Sierra
Club v. Morton, the Court found that organizations meet standing
requirements when one or more of their members meet the standing
requirements individually.78 Therefore, after Sierra Club, ideological
or policy-based organizations, with more resources than most
individuals, have standing to raise claims on behalf of their members.
The Court has also more carefully refined what the injury
element requires. In Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., the Court held that a
"psychological injury," alleged under the Establishment Clause, is not
a sufficient injury for standing purposes when the injury results from
72. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 471 ("The judicial power of the United States
defined by Art. III is not an unconditioned authority to determine the constitutionality of
legislative or executive acts.").
73. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).
74. See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 473.
75. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 41-47 (discussing standing requirements
and jurisprudence). Constitutional and prudential standing requirements are related in the
sense that they impose limits on the Court's ability to hear certain cases, but are also quite
different. Constitutional standing requirements and related jurisprudence are grounded in
Article III of the Constitution, while prudential standing requirements and related jurisprudence
are grounded in other elements of constitutional jurisprudence, such as the separation of powers
doctrine. See id. at 43.
76. See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 473-75.
77. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 41.
78. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).
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observing conduct with which one disagrees.7 9 In Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, the Court reiterated the importance of the actual-and-
individualized-injury requirement, holding that it could not relax the
generalized-grievance prudential limitation on injury even in suits
against the government involving constitutional considerations. 80
However, the Court has recognized one important exception to
the prohibition on generalized grievances.81 In Frothingham v. Mellon,
the Court established the general rule against taxpayer standing,
holding that a litigant, who bases his complaint on his status as a
citizen and taxpayer and who suffers no other injury aside from the
use of his taxes for some allegedly illegal, invalid, or unconstitutional
purpose, does not plead a sufficiently individualized injury.8 2 However,
the Court has recognized one exception to this general prohibition
against taxpayer standing. In Flast v. Cohen, the Court found that a
litigant who raises a particular cause of action under the
Establishment Clause may base his injury on his status as a
taxpayer.83 The Court in Flast developed a two-prong test to
determine whether a litigant properly fell within the delineated
exception to the bar on taxpayer standing.8 4 First, "the taxpayer must
establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative
enactment attacked"8 5 and thus, "will have proper standing to allege
the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under
the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. '"86
79. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 485 ("Although respondents claim that the
Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury
suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the
psychological consequence presumably produced by conduct with which one disagrees. That is
not an injury sufficient to consider standing under Art. III .. ") (emphasis in original).
80. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1992). The Court in Lujan also
rejected a so-called "procedural injury"-that is, that any individual, regardless of whether he
had a discrete injury, could assert that an agency failed to follow correct procedure pursuant to a
policy and has standing merely by virtue of being a citizen and suing pursuant to a particular
statute. Id. at 571-73.
81. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968) (finding that there was a limited
exception to the general rule against taxpayer standing).
82. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480, 487-89 (1923).
83. Flast, 392 U.S. at 106 ("We have noted that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment does specifically limit the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8 ....
[W]e hold that a taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial
power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in
derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing
and spending power.").
84. Id. at 102-03.




Second, "the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and
the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged," by
showing "that the challenged enactment exceeds specific
constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the
congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the
enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by
Art. I, § 8."87 When a litigant satisfies both prongs of the Flast test, he
has standing to bring a case based on his status as a taxpayer.88
Since Flast, the Court has narrowly construed this exception
and has applied it only to cases under the Establishment Clause.8 9
The Court has refused to extend the exception to Establishment
Clause violations by the executive branch, even when the executive
branch issues policies pursuant to congressional allocations of
monies. 9° The Court has also refused to extend the exception to
conveyances of property by state governments, as well as to legislative
or regulatory activities not based on the congressional taxing and
spending power.91 Flast is, therefore, strictly limited to its facts, and
the Court appears reluctant to extend it.92 Nevertheless, it is
significant that this exception exists, however narrow, and that the
Court has recognized that there is something unique about the
Establishment Clause in the standing context. Still, litigants must
meet the other constitutional and prudential standing requirements.
C. The Current State of Establishment Clause Standing: A Complex
Picture
The current state of Establishment Clause standing
jurisprudence is complex and unclear. The facts and outcomes of
87. Id. at 102-03.
88. Id.
89. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 44 (detailing subsequent cases that
challenged the limits of the Flast exception).
90. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 609 (2007) (plurality
opinion) (holding no standing existed to challenge faith-based policies of the executive branch
based on taxpayer standing).
91. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 481-82 (1982) (holding the F/ast exception inapplicable to a state in-kind
transfer of property to a religious institution).
92. Meier, supra note 49, at 179; see also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 44
(detailing cases challenging Flast). However, courts have found that taxpayer standing is
sufficient in some instances. A municipal taxpayer is allowed standing based on his taxpayer
status, since it is understood that an individual's interest in a municipality's coffers is more
significant than in the federal system. See Meier, supra note 49, at 177-78. State taxpayer
standing is more rarely allowed, but has been sufficient in multiple cases. See id.
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Establishment Clause cases vary, reaching issues such as school
prayer, municipal and state religious displays, and financial aid to
private schools. 93 The Court has heard cases on nearly all of these
issues in the past decade, and standing continues to be a troublesome
issue for litigants.94 Litigants seeking to bring a suit for a violation of
the Establishment Clause must decide how to frame the alleged
injury, how to connect the litigant to the alleged Establishment Clause
violation, and how to frame an injury that might be purely psychic or
ideological.
Currently, Establishment Clause standing doctrine requires
that the plaintiff allege some type of injury, and, although courts
interpret this injury requirement to comport with traditional standing
doctrine, it is the nature of the injury alleged that is in question. The
Court has held that a student attending a public school may challenge
a school prayer requirement, 95 but if that student has graduated from
the public school, then the student no longer has standing to challenge
the school prayer requirement. 96 While this makes sense under normal
standing rules, other aspects of Establishment Clause standing
complicate the standing doctrine. For example, in a school prayer
context, a litigant who never attended public schools but who paid
taxes might have standing to allege an Establishment Clause violation
if the facts met the two prongs of the Flast exception. 97 In this
hypothetical, the litigant is alleging an injury that is neither
particular nor individualized; his only connection to the alleged
violation is through his status as a federal taxpayer. How can this
financial injury constitute a type of harm within the same
constitutional injury category as the more concrete injury where a
student is forced to pray in public school?
Other cases outside the Establishment Clause context
complicate this already murky picture of standing. Although the Court
has recognized that injuries resulting from Establishment Clause
violations are unique, 98 the Court has also held that outside the
Establishment Clause context, psychological injuries with slight or
93. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1318-19 (introducing a variety of claims
under the Establishment Clause).
94. See Hein, 551 U.S. at 609; McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851 (2005);
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005).
95. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 207-12 (1963).
96. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 432 (1952).
97. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968).
98. See id. at 103-04, 106 (carving out an exception to the prohibition against taxpayer
standing for the Establishment Clause due to the unique background of the Clause).
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tenuous connections to alleged constitutional violations are not
sufficient injuries for standing purposes. 99 The general stance against
purely psychic or ideological injuries is in tension with Flast and
current Establishment Clause standing jurisprudence. In Van Orden
v. Perry, the Court found that a litigant who merely passed by a statue
of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol
had standing; apparently, his injury was sufficient. 100 Yet, in Valley
Forge Christian College, the Court held that a "psychological
consequence" was not sufficient for standing purposes; some more
concrete harm was required. 101 As the Court has moved from using the
more narrow "coercion" analysis in Establishment Clause cases to the
broader "endorsement" approach, the manner in which it frames
Establishment Clause injuries has also become more unclear and
inconsistent with existing jurisprudence. 102
What is clear is that Establishment Clause standing can be
viewed as following a continuum, where cases with a clearly sufficient
injury such as Abington Township are at one end and cases with
insufficient injuries such as Doremus are at the other.103 In the middle
of this continuum, the Court has attempted to delineate between
injuries that are sufficient and injuries that are insufficient because
they are too psychic or ideological. This Note explores the tensions and
inconsistencies between cases falling on either side of this unclear line
of standing.
III. THE COURT'S ATTEMPTS TO "ESTABLISH" A LINE FOR
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE STANDING DOCTRINE
Supreme Court precedent on Establishment Clause standing
draws formalistic distinctions between what qualifies as a sufficient
injury for standing purposes and what does not.10 4 A close look at
these cases shows that in attempting to delineate this boundary, the
99. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 218-19 (1974)
(denying citizen-taxpayer standing to litigants challenging the Reserve status of Members of
Congress under the Incompatibility Clause); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 205
(1974) (denying citizen-taxpayer standing to a litigant challenging the expenditures of the
Central Intelligence Agency under the Accounting Clause).
100. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691-92 (2005).
101. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464, 485-86 (1982) (plurality opinion).
102. See supra Part II.A (detailing cases applying the coercion and endorsement analyses).
103. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 207-212 (1963); Doremus v.
Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1952).
104. See supra Part II.C.
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Court has created inconsistencies and has relied upon conflicting
Establishment Clause rationales. The cases that involve more psychic
or ideological injuries are sometimes found sufficient by the Court for
standing purposes, but more often, the Court finds them
insufficient. 10 5 This Part addresses both those cases where litigants
had standing and those cases where litigants were denied standing
and then evaluates the distinction the Court has attempted to draw.
A. Sufficient Injuries for Standing Under Current Doctrine
Recently, the Court has allowed standing in several cases that
allege an injury that is somewhat psychic and ideological. Some of the
most notable examples have been in the context of public religious
displays. 106 In these cases, a state or municipality erects or permits an
organization to erect some type of religious display. 10 7 In McCreary
County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, the American
Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") sued two counties in Kentucky for
posting a copy of the Ten Commandments in their respective
courthouses.108 The McCreary County Courthouse initially had a lone
copy of the Ten Commandments posted in a public area. However,
after the filing of an earlier Establishment Clause suit, McCreary
County officials hung copies of other historic documents such as the
Magna Carta and the Declaration of Independence around the copy of
the Ten Commandments. 10 9 The Court did not explicitly address the
issue of standing, but there is evidence that it concluded the plaintiff
met at least the constitutional requirements for standing because it
ruled on the merits. In the majority opinion, for instance, Justice
Souter took care to note that the Ten Commandments were posted in
"a very high traffic area"110 and that the display was "readily visible to
. county citizens who use the courthouse to conduct their civic
business, to obtain or renew driver's licenses and permits, to register
cars, to pay local taxes, and to register to vote." '' These statements
gesture toward some harm or injury suffered by the plaintiff.
105. See supra Part II.C.
106. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1340-65 (discussing case law applying the
Establishment Clause to public religious displays).
107. E.g., Capital Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 758 (1995); Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984); see SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1342.
108. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851-52 (2005).
109. Id. at 851-56.
110. Id. at 851.
111. Id. at 852.
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Although the majority in McCreary County did not directly
address standing, it is clear that, at a minimum, the plaintiffs injury
involved having to walk by a display of the Ten Commandments and
being exposed to the religious display in a government setting."12
Justice Souter emphasized the plaintiffs connection to the religious
display, implicitly justifying the Court's finding of a sufficient injury
by noting that the display was located in an area of the courthouse
that the plaintiff presumably could not avoid. 1 3 However, no other
aspect of the Court's opinion addressed the injury question, allowing
the inference that the plaintiffs sole injury was having to be exposed
to the religious display each time he entered the McCreary County
Courthouse and that such harm alone is sufficient." 4
The Court followed a similar approach in Van Orden v. Perry,
which it decided during the same session as McCreary County." 5 In
Van Orden, the plaintiff alleged that the Texas legislature violated the
Establishment Clause by allowing a sizable stone monument of the
Ten Commandments to stand on the grounds of its capitol building." 6
This monument stood between the capitol building and supreme court
building, amongst sixteen other stone monuments and twenty-one
other historical markers on the grounds. 1 7 Like Justice Souter's
opinion in McCreary County, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in Van Orden failed to address explicitly the question of
standing or the specific injury alleged by the plaintiff, but the Court
must have concluded that the plaintiff met the constitutional
requirements for standing."18 The opinion implicitly recognized the
plaintiffs relation to the statue, noting that "he has encountered the
Ten Commandments monument during his frequent visits to the
Capitol grounds."" 9
The Court in Van Orden implicitly recognized that the
plaintiffs injury of walking by the statue on a semiregular basis was
112. See id. at 851-54; see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (holding that
organizations could bring a suit, as long as one or more of their members represented the claim
brought).
113. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 851-52.
114. See generally id. Also absent from the Court's opinion is any statement that the plaintiff
took offense to the posting of the Ten Commandments; yet, considering the fact that the suit was
initiated, such ideological harm or offense can be inferred.
115. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005).
116. Id. at 681-82.
117. Id. at 681.
118. See generally id. at 682-83.
119. Id. at 682.
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sufficient for standing purposes. 120 Like the plaintiff in McCreary
County, the plaintiff in Van Orden experienced some type of psychic or
ideological offense to the Ten Commandments statue, even though the
statue was located among numerous others on the capitol grounds. 121
In both Van Orden and McCreary County, the personal offense and
ideological injury are only implicitly acknowledged by the Court, and
the Court only briefly notes that the respective plaintiffs have some
type of connection to the allegedly offensive religious displays. 122
Another context in which the Court allows standing for the
Establishment Clause is the area of taxpayer standing. 123 As
explained in Part IJ.B, the only exception to the general prohibition
against citizen-taxpayer standing is when an alleged Establishment
Clause violation fits the narrow two-prong test from Flast v. Cohen. 24
The general citizen-taxpayer prohibition relies on the prudential limit
on generalized grievances; this limit is invoked when a litigant can
plead some injury, but the injury is too widespread and generalized to
be sufficient for standing purposes. 125 One of the reasons the Court
invoked in Flast for carving out such an exception was that the
Framers of the Bill of Rights shared the concern that the "taxing and
spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to
support religion in general."126 In deciding Flast and affirming it in
later cases such as Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court has recognized that
the Establishment Clause warrants an exception to the general
prohibition against taxpayer standing and that there is some type of
harm for which creating such an unprecedented and unique exception
is justified.127
120. See generally id.
121. Id. at 681-82; supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text.
122. See generally McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 852 (2005) ("In each
county, the hallway display was 'readily visible to ... county citizens who use the courthouse to
conduct their civic business, to obtain or renew driver's licenses and permits, to register cars, to
pay local taxes, and to register to vote.' "); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682 ("Van Orden testified that,
since 1995, he has encountered the Ten Commandments monument during his frequent visits to
the Capitol grounds.").
123. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
124. Meier, supra note 49, at 179. See also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 44
(detailing cases challenging Flast).
125. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 43-44.
126. Id. at 102-03.
127. See id.; see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618-20, 622 (1988) (finding that
litigants had taxpayer standing under the Flast exception where litigants challenged federal
grants under the Adolescent Family Life Act).
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However, Flast is not without its own tensions and problems. 128
Since its inception, the Court has narrowly construed Flast and held it
to its facts, indicating the Court's reluctance to expand this exception
even to other aspects of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which
arguably implicate the same type of injury as the Flast exception. 129
Yet, although the Court has had numerous opportunities to overrule
Flast, the exception stands, acting as an implicit recognition that the
nature of the injury in an Establishment Clause context is unique and
deserving of such an exception.130
The public-religious-display cases and Flast-exception cases
push the boundaries the Court has drawn for Establishment Clause
standing. McCreary County and Van Orden relied on the mere fact
that the plaintiffs had some fleeting connection with the displays in
question; these decisions drew largely on the fact that the plaintiffs
had to view the religious monuments, even though both displays
involved the Ten Commandments in a setting with numerous other
secular displays.1 31 Yet the real crux of the injuries in McCreary
County and Van Orden is not that the plaintiffs came into contact with
the displays, but that the displays offended the plaintiffs and caused
them ideological or psychic injury.1 32 Flast and Bowen involve similar
logic, in that the Court draws formalistic distinctions in the area of
taxpayer standing, yet continues to recognize that the Establishment
Clause protects a unique right that warrants an exception to the
general prohibition against taxpayer standing.133
128. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 44.
129. Meier, supra note 49, at 179; see also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 44
(detailing cases challenging Flast).
130. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464, 471, 479, 482 (1982) (holding the Flast exception inapplicable to a state in-kind
transfer of property to a religious institution). In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
Inc., two Justices advocated overruling the Flast exception entirely. 551 U.S. 587, 609 (2007)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("[W]hat experience has shown is that Flast's lack of a logical theoretical
underpinning has rendered our taxpayer-standing doctrine such a jurisprudential disaster that
our appellate judges do not know what to make of it .... I can think of few cases less warranting
of stare decisis respect. It is time-it is past time-to call an end. Flast should be overruled.")
131. See generally Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681-82 (2005); McCreary Cnty. v.
ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851-52 (2005).
132. See generally Van Orden, 545 U.S. 681-82; McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 851-53; Sherry,
supra note 16, at 985 ("[E]very injury caused directly by a violation of the Religion Clauses is, at
bottom, psychological.").
133. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
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B. Insufficient Injuries for Standing Under Current Doctrine
As noted above, the Court has attempted to draw a line
between the cases in which a more psychic or ideological injury is
sufficient and those in which it is not. In general, the litigants who are
denied standing allege the same type of ideological harm as those
litigants who are granted standing; however, one distinguishing factor
is that the litigants denied standing often have less of a personal
connection to the alleged Establishment Clause violation.
In Doremus v. Board of Education, the plaintiff challenged a
New Jersey statute that required a school official to read five verses of
the Old Testament to students daily, without discussing the verses. 134
As the parent of a student who had recently graduated from a New
Jersey high school, the plaintiff opposed the reading of the Bible
verses. 135 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice Jackson, held
the plaintiff lacked standing. 136 The majority reasoned that because
the plaintiffs child had already graduated from high school, the
plaintiff lacked a sufficient connection to the alleged harm.137 In short,
because the plaintiff in Doremus could allege only that the state policy
caused her a psychic or ideological injury, that harm was insufficient
to confer standing.1 38
It is worth looking at the similarities between the alleged
injury in Doremus and those in McCreary County and Van Orden. In
all three cases, the plaintiffs allege very similar Establishment Clause
violations, that is, that the government has engaged in conduct that
constitutes a government-sponsored establishment of religion. 139 That
the religious conduct occurred is what results in injury to all three
134. Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 430-32 (1952).
135. Id. The posture of a parent raising a claim on behalf of his or her child, a public school
student, is common in Establishment Clause jurisprudence and is acceptable for standing
purposes. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004) (where
standing was ultimately denied because of the lack of custody of the litigant's daughter); Sch.
Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 207-12, 226-27 (1963) (where a parent
successfully raised an Establishment Clause violation on behalf of his child).
136. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 431, 435-36 ("Apparently the sole purpose and the only function
of plaintiffs is that they shall assume the role of actors so that there may be a suit which will
invoke a court ruling upon the constitutionality of the statute.").
137. Id. at 432-33.
138. Id. at 435.
139. See id. at 430-31 (challenging a New Jersey statute providing for the reading of Old
Testament verses at the beginning of the public school day); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 682 (2005) (challenging a statue of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the
Texas State Capitol); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850 (2005) (challenging a
framed poster of the Ten Commandments in a Kentucky courthouse).
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plaintiffs. 140 However, the Court's precedent suggests there is a line
between the injuries in McCreary County and Van Orden and the
injury in Doremus.41 The line largely depends on how the prospective
litigant shows a personal connection to the alleged violation. 142 From
this perspective, Establishment Clause standing depends on how the
prospective litigant can demonstrate a connection to the alleged
violation, not on how the alleged violation actually injured the litigant.
In short, the dividing line is not based on the actual effect of the
violation, but rather on more arbitrary facts such as how many times
the plaintiff has encountered a religious display on government
property or whether the plaintiff has graduated from public school by
the time she or her parent files a lawsuit.143
The Court has also denied standing due to insufficient injury in
numerous cases involving taxpayer standing that seem quite
analogous to Flast.1 44 The jurisprudence surrounding Flast has been
inconsistent and highly formalistic.1 45 Flast originally justified the
exception to taxpayer standing on the grounds that the Framers
feared that the "taxing and spending power would be used to favor one
religion over another or to support religion in general. '146 However, on
the occasions when litigants have tried to expand the Flast exception
to new sets of facts, the Court has refused to expand it, even when the
Flast facts and the new facts are functionally analogous. 47 In Valley
140. See Doremus, 342 U.S. at 432; see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682; McCreary Cnty, 545
U.S. at 851-52.
141. See generally McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 852 ("In each county, the hallway display was
readily visible to ... county citizens who use the courthouse to conduct their civic business, to
obtain or renew driver's licenses and permits, to register cars, to pay local taxes, and to register
to vote.") (citations omitted); Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682 ("Van Orden testified that, since 1995,
he has encountered the Ten Commandments monument during his frequent visits to the Capitol
grounds.").
142. See supra Part III.
143. Compare Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682 (allowing standing where litigant walked past
statue of the Ten Commandments on grounds of the Texas Capitol), with Doremus, 342 U.S. at
432 (denying standing to a public school graduate who challenged prayer in public school).
144. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464, 471, 479 (1982) (holding the Flast exception inapplicable to a state in-kind transfer
of property to a religious institution); see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 168, 180
(1974) (denying citizen-taxpayer standing to litigant challenging the expenditures of the Central
Intelligence Agency under the Accounting Clause); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 209-10 (1974) (denying citizen-taxpayer standing to litigants challenging the
Reserve status of Members of Congress under the Incompatibility Clause).
145. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 44 (detailing subsequent cases that
challenged the limits of the Flast exception).
146. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
147. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 609 (2007) (holding
that the Flast exception did not apply to discretionary executive expenditures); Valley Forge
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Forge Christian College v. Americans for the Separation of Church and
State, Americans for the Separation of Church and State alleged a
violation of the Establishment Clause when the State of Pennsylvania
transferred property to Valley Forge Christian College, a religious
institution. 148 The plaintiffs argued that they suffered an injury by the
very fact that the state had transferred the land to the college and
that, alternatively, the Court should use Flast to grant them standing
based on their status as taxpayers. 149 The Court refused to find
standing, holding that the plaintiffs' "psychological injury" was
insufficient to confer standing and that the plaintiffs' argument for
taxpayer standing did not fit into the Flast exception, because the
state transferred the property to the defendant, and thus the transfer
was not under Congress's taxing and spending powers. 150 The Court's
decision in Valley Forge Christian College restricted the grounds for
Establishment Clause standing by ruling out both psychological
injuries and expanded grounds for taxpayer standing.
The Court in Valley Forge Christian College may have failed to
take into account the basic nature of Establishment Clause injuries,
which nearly always involves psychic or ideological harm. 151 Indeed, it
is difficult to imagine an alleged violation under the Establishment
Clause that would not offend a litigant's ideology or beliefs, yet would
still motivate him to bring a claim.152 Standing cases in non-
Establishment-Clause contexts have held that psychic or ideological
injuries are insufficient;153 however, Flast and the "wall of separation"
rationale for the Establishment Clause support the argument that the
nature of the harm here is different and unique.15 4 The fact that all
Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 471, 479 (holding the Flast exception inapplicable to a state in-kind
transfer of property to a religious institution); SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 44
(detailing subsequent cases that challenged the limits of the Flast exception).
148. 454 U.S. at 468-69.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 480, 485.
151. Sherry, supra note 16, at 985.
152. Id.
153. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 485 ("Although respondents claim that the
Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury
suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the
psychological consequence presumably produced by conduct with which one disagrees. That is
not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III ....").
154. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 115 (1968) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("In terms of the
structure and basic philosophy of our constitutional government, it would be difficult to point to
any issue that has a more intimate, pervasive, and fundamental impact upon the life of the
taxpayer-and upon the life of all citizens [than the proscription against government-sponsored
religion]."); see Sherry, supra note 16, at 985 ("The Flast Court, in crafting a separate standing
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Establishment Clause injuries involve ideology or belief, but that such
injury alone is usually insufficient for standing purposes, is deeply
inconsistent and creates significant tension in standing jurisprudence.
In 2007, this tension came to a head in the Court's plurality
opinion in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation.15 5 In Hein, the
plaintiffs sought to challenge President George W. Bush's Faith-Based
Initiatives program, alleging that Congress had allocated federal
funds to the executive, which then distributed the funds in a manner
that violated the Establishment Clause. 156 A plurality decision of the
Court in Hein denied standing to the plaintiffs, explaining that
because the funds were distributed by the executive branch rather
than by Congress, the Flast exception did not apply. 157 Because the
plaintiffs could allege no other injury aside from one that was
inherently psychological, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not
have standing to bring the case. 158
Hein highlights the arbitrary nature of Establishment Clause
standing jurisprudence. The facts in Hein were functionally the same
as those in Flast and Bowen, where Congress allocated funds that
were used in a manner allegedly in violation of the Establishment
Clause. 159 However, the Court drew a line between Hein and Flast
based on the mere fact that in Hein, plaintiffs challenged executive
discretionary spending of monies allocated by Congress under the
taxing and spending power, whereas in Flast, Congress itself directly
allocated the funds under the taxing and spending power.160 This line-
drawing is based on the language in Flast, which emphasizes the
Framers' concern that Congress might use its taxation powers to
support religion. However, the Court failed to take into account the
weighty history supporting the purpose of the Establishment Clause
as a "wall of separation" between church and state. This
interpretation of the Clause would support granting standing for
ideological or psychic injuries. 61 Furthermore, the Court created
doctrine for Establishment Clause cases, accommodated the unique nature of all Establishment
Clause injuries, even if it did not fully recognize what it was doing.").
155. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 592, 597 (2007).
156. Id. at 593-95.
157. Id. at 609.
158. See id. at 599, 608.
159. Id. at 593-94. See generally Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 593, 622 (1988); Flast,
392 U.S. at 85-86, 104.
160. Compare Hein, 551 U.S. at 593-600, with Flast, 392 U.S. at 103.
161. Flast, 392 U.S. at 103-04; see also SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1293-96
(detailing the "wall of separation" metaphor in Establishment Clause substantive law).
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additional inconsistencies in Hein with respect to Flast.162 Scholars
have suggested that in restricting Flast to its facts in Hein, the Court
has "stealth[ily] overrul[ed]" Flast.163 While the truth of this argument
remains to be seen, the Court's ruling and dicta in Hein have further
complicated Establishment Clause jurisprudence.1 64
The Court has also continued to draw formalistic distinctions
in the taxpayer standing context. In Arizona Christian School Tuition
Organization v. Winn, the Court denied standing to a group of Arizona
taxpayers challenging the part of the Arizona tax code that allowed
taxpayers to receive tax credits for permissive contributions to school
tuition organizations, some of which were religious. 1 65 Applying Flast,
the Court reasoned that the tax credit at issue was not analogous to
the governmental expenditures required in Flast, noting that
"awarding some citizens a tax credit allows other citizens to retain
control over their own funds in accordance with their own
consciences." 166 In light of Hein and Winn, the Court will likely
continue to restrict the Flast exception to its facts and reject
functional arguments attempting to expand this exception to other
instances of taxpayer standing.167
C. The Line the Court Has Drawn with Respect to Injuries
The Court's jurisprudence has produced a line defining which
injuries suffice for standing purposes and which do not. On the side of
sufficient injuries, there are cases with very little actual injury; the
mere fact of walking past a religious display several times was found
162. See Sherry, supra note 16, at 979-84 (discussing inconsistencies created by the Court in
Hein in Establishment Clause and standing jurisprudence); Standing in the Mud, supra note 5,
at 1303 (arguing that Hein created an extra requirement to the Flast exception to the prohibition
against taxpayer standing).
163. E.g., Sherry, supra note 16, at 980-81.
164. See id. at 984 ("[T]he decision in Hein represents a failure of human understanding.");
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation,
Inc. and the Future of Establishment Clause Adjudication, BYU L. REV. 115, 167 (2008) ("What
seems evident is that Hein has narrowed the needle of justiciability on which so much
Establishment Clause doctrine rests.").
165. Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1440-41, 1449 (2011).
166. Id. at 1447. This argument largely fails to take into account that the very nature of tax
credit allows taxpayers to save money based on their religious beliefs.
167. See Steven K. Green, The Slow, Tragic Demise of Standing in Establishment Clause




to be sufficient in both McCreary County and Van Orden.168 In both of
those cases, the Court noted that the plaintiff had come into contact
with the religious display on several occasions, allowing the inference
that the plaintiffs personal encounter with the display, in addition to
his psychic or ideological offense taken to the display, was a sufficient
injury. 169 Also on this side of the standing line are cases with facts
that meet the Flast exception exactly. 170
On the side of insufficient injuries are cases such as Doremus
and Valley Forge Christian College, in which the Court denied the
plaintiffs standing because their injuries were purely psychic or
ideological. 17' In essence, a litigant's standing rests on the arbitrary
factor of how many times she walked past a religious display or some
other personal connection to the violation, even when the crux of her
injury lies in the psychic or ideological harm that she felt from the
very existence of the religious display in a government setting. Also on
this side of the line are taxpayer-litigant cases that are often
functionally similar to Flast, but are still denied standing under the
Court's current doctrine. 72 Therefore, the line that the Court has
drawn in this area of standing law also rests on the arbitrary and
largely formalistic factor of whether a prospective litigant's injury
meets the Flast exception exactly. 173
Establishment Clause violations produce a unique harm, and
the nature of that harm creates tension and theoretical inconsistencies
when the Court attempts to reconcile this unique injury with
traditional standing doctrine. 74 The body of law in the area of
Establishment Clause standing, particularly with respect to the injury
requirement, is complex. The nature of Establishment Clause
violations produces an injury that is largely psychic or ideological, yet
current case law fails to encompass claims that are purely psychic or
168. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky.,
545 U.S. 844, 851-52 (2005). This "observer" status is usually sufficient for standing purposes
when the litigant has some personal connection to the alleged violation. Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 164, at 158 ("Except for disputes arising in public schools, standing in government display
cases often rests entirely on 'observer' status.").
169. See generally Van Orden, 545 U.S. 677; McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 851-52.
170. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 164, at 146, 152-55 (discussing the limits of the Flast
exception in Hein).
171. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S.
464, 486-87 (1982) (holding the Flast exception inapplicable to a state in-kind transfer of
property to a religious institution); Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 432 (1952).
172. Doremus, 342 U.S. at 433; see also Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 478 (holding
the Flast exception inapplicable to a state in-kind transfer of property to a religious institution).
173. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 478-81.
174. See supra Part III and accompanying notes.
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ideological. Therefore, prospective litigants seeking to bring
Establishment Clause claims based largely on a psychic or ideological
harm could be deterred from raising meritorious claims by this
unclear and complex area of law.
IV. ESTABLISHING A CLEAR STANDARD FOR ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
STANDING
The Court should clarify this area of the law by drawing a new
bright-line rule that recognizes all Establishment Clause injuries,
whether or not they are psychic or ideological, subject to some
prudential limitations. This rule would acknowledge that psychic
injuries are cognizable injuries within the case or controversy
requirement of Article III, but that psychic injuries should sometimes
be rejected based on prudential concerns. The prudential reasons cited
for the ban on psychic injuries in standing jurisprudence are not
implicated in Establishment Clause cases because of the unique
nature of the harm resulting from these alleged violations. Thus, the
Court should allow psychic injuries as sufficient for standing purposes
in the Establishment Clause context. The Court should maintain its
prohibition against all other psychic injuries, based on the prudential
reasons that the Court has invoked for this prohibition.
A. A Bright-Line Rule Allowing Psychic Injuries in Establishment
Clause Cases
Although the Supreme Court has held that purely psychic
injuries do not fall within the case or controversy requirement of
Article 11,175 the Court should reconsider the question of whether
psychic injuries are constitutionally sufficient to confer standing. 176
The Court should reason that psychic injuries fit within the
constitutional case or controversy requirement, but that courts should
prohibit them for prudential reasons. Because the Court has held that
taxpayer standing can be sufficient, even when there is not a
175. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 485 ("Although respondents claim that the
Constitution has been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury
suffered by them as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the
psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one
disagrees. That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III .... ").
176. See Sherry, supra note 16, at 985 ("[E]very injury caused directly by a violation of the
Religion Clauses is, at bottom, psychological.").
2012] 1005
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
traditional injury-in-fact, 177 the Court should hold that psychic
injuries do indeed fall within the Article III case or controversy
requirement. However, the Court should recognize that prudential
limitations on standing support a general ban on psychic injuries
conferring standing. As the Court has recognized in prior standing
jurisprudence, psychic injuries are limited by the prudential
consideration of generalized grievances, which are insufficient injuries
because they are too abstract and widely shared by others. 178 The
Court has also found that psychic injuries lack "concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues."179 Generally, these
prudential considerations reinforce the Court's rejection of psychic
injuries as sufficient for standing purposes.180
However, Establishment Clause cases involve unique harms
that inevitably are psychic injuries.181 As demonstrated by Part III of
this Note, Establishment Clause standing jurisprudence is
inconsistent as to the question of what injury suffices for standing
purposes. 8 2 In numerous cases, the Court has adjudicated claims
based on the plaintiffs observer status of religious displays and has
predicated standing on the observer's alleged personal connection to
the religious display in question.183 In others, the Court has recognized
a narrow exception to taxpayer standing based on the unique
historical and constitutional status of the Establishment Clause.18 4
Both lines of cases are in essence legal fictions, addressing attenuated
observer or taxpayer connections to the harm, rather than the psychic
injuries at stake. Regardless, in all Establishment Clause cases, the
psychic injury is the real harm at issue.
177. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (allowing taxpayer standing when
the litigant meets a narrow exception to the general prohibition against taxpayer standing).
178. Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 488-90.
179. Id. at 486 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
180. Id. at 488-90.
181. Sherry, supra note 16, at 985.
182. See supra Part III and accompanying notes.
183. See generally Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of
Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 869 (2005). In Valley Forge Christian College, the Court eschewed this type of
"observer" standing. 454 U.S. at 485 ("Although respondents claim that the Constitution has
been violated, they claim nothing else. They fail to identify any personal injury suffered by them
as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error, other than the psychological consequence
presumably produced by observation of conduct with which one disagrees. That is not an injury
sufficient to confer standing under Art. III ....").
184. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-04 (allowing taxpayer standing based on a
narrow two-prong exception to the general prohibition against taxpayer standing).
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Further, a widely shared psychic injury can still be deeply
personal and individualized.1 8 5  Based on its nature in the
Establishment Clause context, a psychic injury is a personal offense
and harm done to one's mind.18 6 This type of individualized psychic
injury does not implicate the concerns that the prudential limitation
against generalized grievances is intended to guard against. As
discussed in Part III, the Court has drawn arbitrary lines dictating
which injuries are sufficient for standing, when all alleged injuries in
this context are in fact psychic at the core. 8 7 Thus, because
Establishment Clause psychic injuries do not implicate the concerns of
the generalized-grievances limitation and because such psychic
injuries are involved in every Establishment Clause claim, the Court
should allow these psychic injuries in the Establishment Clause
standing context, free of prudential limitations.
B. The Utility and Consistency of a Bright-Line Rule in the
Establishment Clause Context
This bright-line rule, allowing psychic injuries for
Establishment Clause cases, would (1) resolve the current tension
within the Establishment Clause doctrine; (2) correspond with the
Court's trend toward using the endorsement analysis; and (3) make
the prevailing interpretation of injury more consistent with the
history and rationale of the Establishment Clause.
This bright-line rule would eliminate the legal fiction of injury
created by observer-of-religious-display cases, such as Van Orden, and
taxpayer standing cases, such as Flast, by properly focusing on the
psychic injury and not on attenuated connections to the harm.188
Additionally, this bright-line rule would eliminate the dependence on
a plaintiffs personal connection to an alleged violation as a basis for
granting standing, because all litigants who allege a psychic injury
would be granted standing by the courts, regardless of how many
times they observed the alleged violation.18 9 A bright-line rule would
reduce judicial discretion in determining whether the prospective
litigant's personal connection to the alleged violation is sufficient and
would therefore reconcile existing tensions and inconsistencies
185. Sherry, supra note 16, at 985.
186. Id.
187. See id. ("[Elvery injury caused directly by a violation of the Religion Clauses is, at
bottom, psychological."); supra Part III.
188. See generally Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682; Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-04.
189. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682.
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regarding the injury requirement in Establishment Clause standing
doctrine. 190 Additionally, the Court has struggled with Flast for years,
and despite numerous opportunities to overrule the exception, the
Court has simply limited it to its facts. 191 Recognizing a psychic or
ideological injury as a sufficient harm for standing purposes would
eliminate the need for taxpayer standing in an Establishment Clause
context, since the allegation of a psychic injury would be itself
sufficient.
A bright-line rule allowing standing for all psychic and
ideological injuries is also consistent with the Court's recent trend
toward an endorsement analysis when examining Establishment
Clause claims. 192 Because standing is linked to substantive law when
defining an injury, the Court's trend toward using an endorsement
analysis supports the recognition of purely psychic or ideological
injuries for standing purposes. 193 The endorsement analysis generally
focuses on whether the government has impermissibly endorsed
religion. 194  Because the harm flowing from the government's
endorsement of religion is necessarily widespread and psychic, it
makes sense to adopt standing rules consistent with the Court's
substantive approach. 195 Indeed, the Court analyzed Van Orden and
McCreary County, both of which involved somewhat ideological
injuries with more arbitrary personal connections to the alleged
Establishment Clause violations, under an endorsement approach. 196
A bright-line rule permitting these psychic and ideological injuries
would therefore be most consistent with the Court's recent trend
toward endorsement analysis. Further, this consistency with the
substantive law would allow courts to grant standing to and then
dismiss on the merits cases in which the litigants alleged psychic
190. Reducing judicial discretion in the Establishment Clause standing context would also
reduce the potential for judicial value judgments that exist under the current approach to
Establishment Clause standing. See Sherry, supra note 16, at 983 (discussing the Court's
treatment of Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803 (2010), a religious display case involving a large
wooden cross, in which Justice Scalia "denied that the cross was a Christian symbol").
191. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 44 (detailing subsequent cases that challenged
the limits of the Flast exception).
192. See, e.g., Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94
(1989) ("In recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged
governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of 'endorsing' religion, a concern that has
long had a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.").
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 3, at 1319-23.
196. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682, 712 (2005); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of
Ky., 545 U.S. 833, 851, 883 (2005).
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injury but lacked sufficient harm under substantive law. Dismissing
cases on the merits rather than on standing grounds would buttress
an important aspect of our democratic framework. Allowing litigants
to allege psychic injuries that are later dismissed on the merits, rather
than on standing grounds, would be an important recognition of a
citizen's right to challenge government establishment of religion. This
consistency would further prevent a flood of cases in the federal
courts, since courts could dismiss cases on the merits, rather than on
standing grounds. 197
The Clause's history and the more prevalent "wall of
separation" rationale likewise support a bright-line rule allowing
Establishment Clause standing based on psychic and ideological
injuries. While the Framers thought about the Establishment Clause
against a history of religious persecution in Europe, key Framers such
as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison recognized that government
establishment of religion affected one's mind as well as one's life and
liberty.198 In Everson v. Board of Education, Justice Black's majority
opinion noted that the Framers, and James Madison in particular,
drafted the Establishment Clause with the belief that "the best
interest of a society required that the minds of men always be wholly
free."199 Indeed, the emphasis on the intrusion of government
establishment of religion into the minds of individuals was an
underlying principle of the Establishment Clause and thus supports a
bright-line rule allowing standing for psychic injuries in this context.
V. CONCLUSION
Standing law concerning Establishment Clause claims has
become a murky and complex body of cases in which the Court has
blurred the line between what constitutes a sufficient injury and what
does not.200 Recent cases have allowed a litigant to allege a psychic or
ideological injury, as long as the litigant also alleges some, at times
arbitrary, personal connection to the alleged Establishment Clause
197. JUDITH A. MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (1993) (discussing the reasons for and disagreements about the "crisis
of volume" in the federal courts).
198. LEVY, supra note 21, at 245. See generally MADISON, supra note 29.
199. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947) (emphasis added); see also LEVY, supra
note 21, at 129 (detailing Madison's support for Jefferson's bill for religious freedom).
200. See supra Part III and accompanying notes.
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violation.2 1 These cases have contributed to the tensions and
inconsistencies in Establishment Clause standing doctrine. In
addition, the Court continues to restrict, yet uphold, the Flast
exception to the general prohibition against taxpayer standing,
further complicating this body of law.202  The Court's recent
jurisprudence has made it difficult for litigants to determine whether
they have a sufficient injury to raise an Establishment Clause claim.
Due to the nature and rationale of the Establishment Clause and the
Court's recent jurisprudential trends, the Court should allow purely
psychic or ideological injuries in this context to satisfy the injury
requirement of standing law.
By adopting a bright-line rule that purely psychic and
ideological injuries will satisfy the injury requirement for standing
under the Establishment Clause, the Court could resolve current
tensions in standing law. By eliminating the need for courts to
determine a personal connection between the prospective litigant and
the alleged violation, all a litigant would need to do is allege a psychic
or ideological injury to have a sufficient injury for Establishment
Clause standing purposes.20 3  This bright-line rule would also
eliminate the need for litigants to base their claims on the Flast
exception and would thus eradicate the need for an exception to the
general prohibition against taxpayer standing. 20 4 The Court should
therefore adopt a bright-line rule allowing psychic and ideological
injuries and finally clarify and reconcile the injury requirement of
standing doctrine under the Establishment Clause.
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